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The instrument of concurrency, whereby UK regulatory authorities share and often in practice lead in 
the application of competition policy, is an important feature of the UK competition law regime. Several 
studies examined its pros and cons. This article takes a different approach and critically assesses 
Ofcom’s application of its concurrent competition law powers to the telecoms sector. This review 
identifies a number of shortfalls and provides several recommendations on how Ofcom could improve 
its record in applying its competition law powers to the telecoms sector to benefit consumers. 
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The UK Office of Communications (Ofcom) has both ex ante regulatory powers stemming from the 
Communications Act 2003 (CA03) and ex post competition powers from the Competition Act 1998 
(CA98) and the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02) and the CA03, the latter only in relation to the broadcasting 
sector. It shared its ex post powers initially with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and now the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). This arrangement, referred to as “concurrency”, also 
applies to other UK regulatory authorities such as the Gas and Electricity Market Authority (Ofgem), 
the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat), NHS Improvement, the Office of Rail Regulation 
(ORR) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  
The institution of concurrency, which is almost unique to the UK, has been examined and assessed 
in some detail by government and academic studies. This article takes a different approach. It does not 
look at concurrency from a theoretical or institutional perspective. Instead, it critically assesses Ofcom’s 
main competition policy decisions under its competition powers in the telecoms sector. These include 
several exclusionary abuses of dominance under Chapter II of the CA98 (equivalent to Article 102 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).1 We assess Ofcom’s competition decisions in 
the broadcasting decision in a separate article.2  
Given that all Ofcom’s decisions are exclusionary abuses of dominance, we approached this 
assessment by applying a framework based on a firm’s ability to abuse its dominant position, its 
incentives to do so and the anti-competitive effects of the identified behaviour for consumers. This is 
the generally accepted approach by economists, even though currently some elements of this approach 
may not be legally required. 
This article is organised as follows: 
 Section 2 briefly describes concurrency and provides a high-level overview of Ofcom’s 
application of its competition powers; 
 Section 3 provides a detailed assessment of Ofcom’s main exclusionary abuse of dominance 
decisions; and  
 Section 4 draws out the main conclusions and recommendations.  
Overall, we consider that, with a couple of notable exceptions, Ofcom’s approach has tended to be 
formalistic, rarely examined the dominant firm’s incentives and almost never systematically considered 
whether the practice has or can have any anti-competitive effects. Instead, Ofcom’s focus in most of 
these decisions was on finding dominance and proving that the behaviour conformed to a particular type 
of abuse. Instead, we consider that significantly more attention should be given to the dominant firm’s 
incentives and effects on competition and consumers. In terms of evidence, Ofcom has relied to a 
significant extent on internal documents, which often require careful interpretation, and on price-cost 
                                                     
* I have worked at Ofcom during most of the relevant period – i.e. from 2004 to 2016, with the exception of 2012-13 when 
I was seconded to the CC. However, I was only directly involved in the 2005 decision to accept undertakings in lieu of a 
reference to the CC (Ofcom, 2005) and in peer reviewing an early version of the Freeserve decision (Ofcom 2010). The 
views and opinions expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
my past, current or future employers. While I have received many helpful suggestions and comments, the responsibility for 
any remaining errors remains solely with the author. 
1 Although Ofcom has also powers on agreements under Chapter I of the CA98 (equivalent to Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union), a more formal (in the past with the OFT) and informal (in the past with the CC, 
currently with the CMA and European Commission) advisory role for mergers, we have not covered these decisions as 
there is much less publicly available material. 
2 In most cases, the legal basis for these decisions was either the EA02 or Section 316 of the CA03, which applies to 
broadcasting and is akin to competition law rules.  
Pietro Crocioni 
2 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
tests for margin squeeze or predation. These are very useful tools, but their interpretation needs to be 
put into a wider context by providing a credible exclusionary story backed up by additional evidence, 
including credible evidence of both incentives to exclude and anti-competitive effects. In most cases, 
the latter were missing. We consider that this increases the risks that Ofcom may make incorrect 
inferences and ultimately decisions.  
All Ofcom’s CA98 decisions in the telecom sector are non-infringements. The only infringement 
decision under the CA98 is Royal Mail in the postal sector.3 While CA98 non-infringement decisions 
may, in themselves, not be a concern, Ofcom’s record raises some questions about its approach to 
opening cases. This may reflect the lack of systematic application of an ability, incentives and effects 
approach as a tool to screen which cases to open. In particular, we consider that the failure to consider 
whether a dominant firm faces incentives to behave anti-competitively is particularly important in 
explaining the high proportion of cases ending as non-infringement. These could still serve a useful 
function, if they clarified Ofcom’s approach and, hence, improve the ability of firms to comply. 
However, we noted that the approach used by Ofcom is often inconsistent over time and across decisions 
covering the same or similar type of exclusionary behaviour. To mention one among several examples, 
Ofcom’s position shifted considerably on whether price-cost tests would be useful or whether the 
standard should be that of an Equally Efficient Operator (EEO),4 adjusted EEO5 or even a Reasonably 
Efficient Operator (REO).6  
2. Concurrency  
The term concurrency refers to the powers given to the UK regulatory authorities to apply aspects of ex 
post competition law to their industry of competence. Concurrency covers anti-competitive agreements 
(Chapter I), abuse of dominance (Chapter II) and the power to carry out market studies, which could 
now lead to a reference to the CMA - and earlier on to the Competition Commission (CC) for a full 
market investigation. Concurrency means that anti-competitive behaviour can be investigated either by 
the relevant regulatory authority or by the CMA, although the latter has generally agreed to leave the 
powers to the relevant regulatory authority.7 More recently, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 (ERRA13) also significantly enhanced the sector regulators’ concurrency obligations.8 
The institution of concurrency has been extensively debated, however, solely from an institutional 
perspective (Stern, 2015 and Weeds, 2004). The National Audit Office (NAO) also assessed the 
effectiveness of the operation and oversight of the UK competition regime. It showed that over the 
period 2000-01 to 2015 Ofcom opened 25 cases, all non-infringements.9 This compared with the 
                                                     
3 Ofcom, Discriminatory pricing in relation to the supply of bulk mail delivery services in the UK, CW/01122/01/14, 2018, 
available at https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/124591/01122-infringement-decision.pdf. 
4 The EEO test uses the dominant firm’s own costs to assess whether the dominant firm could trade profitably if it faced the 
upstream prices it offered to its downstream rivals and the downstream price it charged to its consumers. 
5 This takes the EEO, see footnote 4, and adjusts it for costs that entrants have to incur but the incumbent does not. 
6 Differently from the EEO, see footnote 4, the REO makes use of the cost of a reasonably efficient rival instead of the 
dominant firm’s own costs. Ofcom argued in favour of the REO standard in Royal Mail, though it did not apply it (Crocioni, 
2019).  
7 See, for example, CMA and Ofcom memorandum of understanding, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cma-and-ofcom-memorandum-of-understanding.  
8 This includes: (1) Regulatory authorities have to consider using their (ex post) competition powers before using their direct 
(ex ante) regulatory powers; (2) ERRA13 set out institutions and mechanisms for co-operation between the CMA and the 
regulatory authorities over concurrency policy, procedures and case allocation – i.e. UK Competition Network (UKCN); 
(3) There are also powers for the CMA to take over competition cases from regulators; and (4) Regulatory authorities can 
have their concurrency powers removed by the Government, if they are deemed consistently not to have used them 
sufficiently and caused some detriment of competition in the UK. 
9 NAO, 2016, Fig. 11-12. 
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OFT/CMA with 67 cases, of which only 22 were non-infringements, Ofgem (five, of which one was an 
infringement decision) Ofwat (five, of which two ended with commitments) and the ORR (nine, of 
which one infringement and one commitment). Hence, Ofcom stands out for being the most active 
sectoral regulator, though also having the lowest proportion of infringement decisions. More recently, 
Ofcom found that Royal Mail (RM) infringed Chapter II. The NAO concluded that “[t]o enforce 
competition law successfully, the regime needs to build up a steady flow of successful high-profile cases, 
decisions and fines that withstand appeal. A decision that finds an infringement of competition law can 
provide a deterrent effect, clarify the law and result in financial penalties. Lower profile and local, 
targeted cases can also play an important role in promoting deterrence, particularly among small and 
medium-sized enterprises. A non-infringement decision is unlikely to provide as much deterrence, but 
can help to clarify the law and set a precedent.”10 
This article instead opts for assessing the practical application of concurrent powers by Ofcom to the 
telecoms sector, by critically looking at its main CA98 decisions. 
3. Abuses of dominance  
Ofcom opened several exclusionary abuse of dominance investigations since its creation. This article 
focus only on the most important cases (Table 1). We do not examine these decisions in chronological 
order. Sections 3.1 covers the key margins squeeze decisions, while Section 3.2 examines a couple of 
cases including a decision to accept undertaking in lieu of a market reference based on a non-price 
discrimination abuse (Ofcom, 2005) and a predation case (Ofcom, 2006).  
Table 1: Ofcom’s Chapter II main decisions  
Case Reference Description Outcome 
Non-price 
Discrimination  
(Ofcom, 2005) Market study type of intervention under the 
EA02. BT was found to have engaged in 
non-price discrimination against 
downstream rivals. 
Ofcom accepted 
undertakings in lieu of a 
reference to the CC for a 
market investigation. 
Cordless Phones (Ofcom, 2006) Ch. II/Art 102. BT was alleged to have 
engaged in predation in the market for 
wholesale distribution of all consumer fixed-
line telephone equipment. 
Non-infringement. 
Freeserve (Ofcom, 2010) Ch. II/Art 102. BT was alleged to have 
engaged in a margin squeeze in the market 
for the supply of retail residential broadband 
Internet access services.  
Non-infringement. 
Thus/Gamma (Ofcom, 2013) Ch. II/Art 102. BT was alleged to have 
engaged in a margin squeeze in the market 




(Ofcom, 2014) Ch. II/Art 102. BT was alleged to have 
engaged in a margin squeeze in the market 
for retail SFBB. 
Non-infringement. 
We examine these cases under an “enhanced” ability, incentive and effects framework, which includes 
five elements: 
1. Ability - this is reflected in the dominance assessment, as only firms with market power can 
successfully engage in anti-competitive behaviour and harm consumers. Dominance is, therefore, a 
critical element in the legal test; 
2. Incentives - a dominant firm does not always have incentives to exclude. A good understanding of 
incentives can help in both deciding whether to open an investigation and better interpret evidence, 
such as the results of a price-cost test, if and when an investigation is opened;  
                                                     
10 NAO, 2016, para 2.7. 
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3. Price-cost test - in margin squeeze and predation cases, a price-cost test showing negative margins 
is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to conclude that exclusionary concerns may be 
warranted; 
4. Empirical evidence - empirical evidence, but also facts, are critical in supporting an exclusionary 
behaviour theory of harm and, in particular, a credible exclusionary story. These are important not 
only in relation to price-cost tests, but also in assessing the company’s incentives to exclude and the 
anti-competitive effects; and  
5. Anti-competitive effects - any attempt by a dominant firm to exclude its rivals must be a concern, if 
it ultimately harms consumers. To illustrate with the simplest example, if a dominant firm attempted 
to predate against rivals, but failed, consumers may gain from at least temporarily lower prices. 
Hence, there is a case for not punishing dominant firms if, they attempt, but fail, to exclude. In 
addition, but separately, assessing whether anti-competitive effects occurred or are likely to occur 
can provide critical information in interpreting the results of a price-cost test. For example, if the 
latter showed negative margins, but there was no evidence of rivals being negatively affected, 
further analysis and checks would be required.  
Three of the Ofcom’s decisions in Table 1 covered margin squeeze allegations in the telecom sector: 
Freeserve (Ofcom, 2010), Thus/Gamma (Ofcom, 2013) and SFBB (Ofcom, 2014). Freeserve and SFBB 
concerned broadband services, then growing markets, while Thus/Gamma concerned a declining market 
for call services.  
3.1.1 Freeserve - The first meaningful attempt  
British Telecom (BT), the vertically integrated UK telecoms incumbent, dominant in the upstream 
market for residential wholesale broadband services, was alleged to have undertaken a margin squeeze 
in the downstream market for retail residential broadband Internet access services in the UK. The 
concern focused on the possible exclusion of third party Internet Service Providers (ISPs) relying on 
BT’s IPStream upstream product. Ofcom adopted a by then well-rehearsed approach to margin squeeze 
– i.e. a vertically integrated firm with upstream dominance that squeezes the margins of downstream 
competitors.11 There were two cases related to different periods and several decision and subsequent 
appeals to the CAT. We focus on the most recent decision (Ofcom, 2010). The allegation was that BT 
had engaged in a margin squeeze over the period June 2002 to December 2004. Previously, Ofcom’s 
predecessor, The Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), concluded that BT had not engaged in a margin 
squeeze over the period up to June 2002. 
The downstream market was defined to include all broadband residential services including those 
provided by cable operators – i.e. Virgin Media (VM). In a margin squeeze allegation the upstream 
market definition is critical for a finding of dominance. The key issue was whether a downstream service 
offered by a cable provider that very rarely supplied upstream products to ISPs in direct competition 
with BT, should be included in the upstream market definition and, critically, dominance assessment. 
The main point of debate was whether VM’s downstream services could indirectly constrain upstream 
providers12 from increasing their upstream prices, in this case BT’s IPStream.13 This mechanism is 
referred to as “indirect constraints”. ISPs could choose which service elements they buy from BT, and 
which ones they self-supply. As shown in Figure 1, downstream competitors need to self-supply 
progressively more service elements if they moved from IPStream, to DataStream and lastly to Local 
                                                     
11 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.1. 
12 BT and other third parties relying on other BT’s upstream services, such as DataStream and Local Loop Unbundling (LLU). 
Ofcom, 2010, para 2.159. 
13 Ofcom, 2010, para 2.163. 
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Loop Unbundling (LLU) products. Ofcom decided to include cable in the upstream market and to 
separately assess the strength of its constraint in its dominance assessment.14 
Despite cable services covered only about half of the UK and BT had a share of less than 50% in 
certain cable areas and nearly 90% in non-cable areas, Ofcom defined a UK-wide geographic market, 
because of BT’s prices did not vary geographically, which, according to Ofcom, was “indicative of a 
common pricing constraint.”15  
Figure 1: Upstream and downstream elements in BT and cable options 
 
Ofcom concluded that BT was dominant upstream. In reaching this conclusion, Ofcom considered that 
this was an immature and fast growing market and, hence, market shares would be a less reliable 
indicator of dominance.16 However, although it included cable in the relevant product market, Ofcom 
focused most of its dominance assessment on estimating the strength of the indirect constraints from 
cable and its impact on market shares. According to Ofcom, BT’s upstream market shares, which was 
close to 100%, did not take into account the indirect constraints, while its downstream market share was 
not a good proxy because cable only exerted an indirect constraint. Ofcom’s main starting point was 
that that because cable exerted an indirect constraint upstream, its effects were diluted and weaker.17 As 
a result, Ofcom claimed that BT’s (cable’s) downstream market shares should be adjusted upwards 
(downwards) for these to be used as good proxies for market power upstream.18 At its basic, Ofcom’s 
argument can be interpreted as follows. As the price of IPStream is about 60% of the retail price, a 10% 
upstream price increase would be passed-through (assuming full pass-through) as a 6% downstream 
price increase.19 It applied two methods to estimate the market share implications. First, it reduced the 
                                                     
14 Ofcom, 2010, para 2.166. 
15 Ofcom, 2010, para 2.188. 
16 Ofcom, 2010, para 3.12. 
17 Ofcom, 2010, para 3.29. 
18 Ofcom, 2010, paras 3.10 and 3.32. 
19 Ofcom, 2010, paras 3.29-30. 
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cable downstream shares by 40% and increased the downstream shares of other operators accordingly. 
As a result of these adjustments, BT’s upstream market share was estimated to range from 47% to 71% 
over the relevant period. Second, Ofcom recognised weaknesses in the former approach and also 
adjusted the upstream market shares on the basis of what it termed theoretical relationships between 
market power and market shares and, separately, between the upstream and downstream demand.20 This 
adjustment increased BT’s downstream market share (as a proxy for upstream market shares) from a 
40-60% to a 60-100% range over the relevant period.21 Ofcom also reported that BT’s net additions 
increased from 47% in June 2002 to 76% in December 200422 and estimated BT’s share of addressable 
lines23 to be in the 60-70% range.24 Overall, BT was found to be dominant upstream,25 based on its 
(adjusted) upstream market shares being over 40%, its higher coverage relative to cable and the presence 
of high barriers to entry and expansion.26 
The abuse assessment relied solely on a price-cost test. Ofcom opted for a Long Run Incremental 
Cost (LRIC) standard and applied the test to all residential broadband products.27 It relied on three 
approaches:28 
 historical cost accounting based on the actual costs and revenues, as recorded in the company’s 
accounts;  
 Net Present Value (NPV) based on discounted future cash receipts net of payments; and  
 cohort analysis based on taking revenues and costs for a group of customers – i.e. those taking the 
service in a particular period (e.g. one month) - and estimating their NPV.  
Ofcom indicated a preference for the NPV approaches.29 “In this case, Ofcom considers that, whilst the 
historical analysis is clearly of relevance in considering BT’s conduct during the period, a finding of 
losses on the basis of the historical analysis would not be sufficient to lead to a finding of infringement 
since the analysis does not take into account other considerations relevant to the assessment of a margin 
squeeze in the circumstances of an immature and developing market.”30 The main consideration was 
that in such markets prices may be particularly low in the early phases to boost initial demand and, 
failing to take a longer term view, may increase the risk of a false conviction (Type I error).31 However, 
Ofcom also recognised that the NPV approach is based on forecast information and, therefore, subject 
to uncertainty.32  
Ofcom made several adjustments to BT’s data in its statement of objections to ensure that they 
reflected the purpose of the analysis. For example and among others, in applying its NPV approach 
                                                     
20 Ofcom, 2010, para 3.37 and Annex 2. 
21 Ofcom, Figure 3.5. At the end of the period, the adjusted reported share was higher than 100%. 
22 Ofcom, 2010, para 3.46. 
23 These lines could be quickly served, reflecting the network coverage that existed at the time. 
24 Ofcom, 2010, paras 3.51-52. 
25 Ofcom, 2010, para 3.98. 
26 Ofcom, 2010, para 3.87. 
27 Ofcom, 2010, paras 4.14 and 4.22. 
28 Ofcom, 2010, paras 4.34-36. 
29 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.41. 
30 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.43. 
31 Ofcom, 2010, paras 4.48 and 4.61. Although an authority will strive to make the right decision, it faces some positive 
probability to incur in errors. It may: (a) intervene when it should not. These are termed Type I errors (false convictions), 
which in this case mean sanctioning behaviour which is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects and/or whose likely effects 
are more than outweighed by efficiency justifications; or (b) fail to intervene when it should. These are termed Type II 
errors (false acquittals), which in this case means not sanctioning behaviour that is likely to have anticompetitive effects.  
32 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.50. 
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Ofcom noted that “BT’s calculations were based on an assumption that unit costs would fall in the future 
but that unit revenues would remain static (or would increase slightly).”33 The implied increase in 
margins appeared at odd with a market that was expected to face increasing competition. Ofcom 
provisionally found that the NPV would be negative, pointing to a margin squeeze, under a range of 
scenarios.34 However, BT claimed that most of these adjustments were not appropriate35 and Ofcom 
recognised the validity of some of BT’s arguments.36 Based on its revised assumptions and sensitivity 
analysis, Ofcom concluded against finding an infringement because: “Ofcom’s sensitivity analysis 
shows that, under certain assumptions which BT might have regarded as reasonable at that time, an 
NPV analysis commencing on 1 June 2002 might have produced positive results. Taking into account 
the uncertainties associated with a rapidly developing market and the fact that BT could not have been 
aware of the approach which Ofcom would take to the NPV analysis until November 2003, this suggests 
that the negative NPV analysis seen from 1 June 2002 cannot be relied upon to support a finding that 
BT abused a dominant position.”37  
Assessment 
This is largely a formal decision, as Ofcom did not assess BT’s incentives to exclude entrants and did 
not consider the possible effects of BT’s alleged exclusionary behaviour. The choice to take into account 
the indirect constraint exerted by cable is noteworthy, but Ofcom focused too much on how to adjust 
market shares rather than considering how this affected its upstream dominance assessment.  
A substantial part of the decision focused on the dominance assessment and, in particular, on 
adjusting BT’s downstream market shares in order for them to be a good proxy of upstream dominance. 
While we consider that it is important that indirect constraints are adequately reflected in the dominance 
assessment, we have two main concerns with Ofcom’s approach. First, adjusting market shares 
implicitly assumes that the latter are a good indicator of market power. They could be only if the services 
are homogeneous, as the Lerner Index relationship, which Ofcom uses as the basis for its adjustment, is 
based on a Cournot model with homogeneous products. This is not the case for broadband access 
services, which are differentiated along many features – i.e. speed, contention rates etc. – and critically 
in this case by technology - i.e. cable vs ADSL.  
Second, even assuming that that market shares should be adjusted, we have some concerns with both 
methods used by Ofcom. The first method – reducing the cable market shares by the so-called dilution 
factor, which is the ratio of the upstream to the downstream price - is arbitrary by Ofcom’s own 
admission. However, the second method also raises important questions. In essence, Ofcom argued that 
the constraint from cable, being indirect, was necessarily less strong, hence, BT’s downstream market 
shares had to be adjusted to correctly reflect cable’s reduced upstream constrain on BT’s market power. 
To illustrate, suppose cable and BT had each a 50% downstream market share and that the upstream 
price was 50% of the downstream price. Ofcom argued that BT’s upstream market shares should be 
75% and that of cable 25%, respectively. However, such an adjustment may be unwarranted. As pointed 
out by Inderest and Valletti (2007), the answer may depend on the degree of competition upstream and 
downstream, respectively. If downstream competition was very intense and, hence, the firms’ 
downstream elasticity of demand was high, upstream suppliers would be strongly constrained from 
increasing their upstream prices by the presence of a vertically integrated firm. In this case, downstream 
market shares would be a good proxy for upstream market shares and power – i.e. BT would be unable 
to increase its upstream price – and downstream market shares should not be modified. Conversely, 
                                                     
33 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.63. 
34 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.65. 
35 Ofcom, 2010, paras 4.66-86. 
36 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.87. 
37 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.136. 
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suppose upstream competition was strong, any attempts by the upstream dominant firm to raise its prices 
would be thwarted. Downstream competition consequently would play a relatively marginal role. In this 
case, one could safely rely on upstream market shares. The decision reported some evidence suggesting 
that upstream competition was limited. As mentioned above, BT was almost the sole supplier of 
IPStream types of services because, at the time, third party suppliers making use of DataStream and 
LLU were very few and cable hardly ever supplied upstream services. Conversely, the decision reports 
that in areas, where BT competed with cable, it had a market share of less than 50%. This signals that 
downstream, where cable competed directly BT, competition may have been intense. This may suggest 
that unadjusted downstream market shares could have been a more appropriate indicator for upstream 
market shares, to the extent that these were an appropriate dominance indicator to start with. Overall, 
we consider that indirect constraints could have been taken into account in an in-the-round assessment 
of BT’s market power, rather than via trying to adjust market shares by assigning so much relevance to 
the standard 40% threshold for dominance. Instead, more attention should have been devoted to better 
understanding either the upstream elasticity of demand, which would have also taken into account the 
impact of any indirect constraint, or the degree of downstream competition between cable and BT.  
An assessment of the incentives of a dominant firm to engage in exclusionary behaviour can shed 
light on whether an alleged abuse is likely to have taken place. If an authority concluded that a dominant 
firm had no or limited incentives to engage in exclusionary behaviour, any evidence to the contrary – 
i.e. a price-cost test showing negative margins – should be interpreted very cautiously. In other words, 
considering the dominant firm’s incentives could considerably reduce the risk of errors. In this case, it 
was alleged that BT engaged in a margin squeeze by acting on the upstream price of IPStream and that 
of its downstream services. As shown in Figure 1, BT also offered other upstream services – i.e. 
DataStream and LLU – both requiring fewer upstream inputs from BT. This means that, if BT 
successfully squeezed its IPStream downstream rivals, the latter may have switched to either 
DataStream or LLU. As this could reduce its upstream profits, BT may have had limited incentives to 
do so. Ofcom considered this under barriers to entry rather than under BT’s incentives. The decision 
appears correct in this respect, as Ofcom concluded that the adoption of either LLU or DataStream was 
too limited over the relevant period for BT to not to have an incentive to exclude.38  
A long time elapsed between the original complaint and the final decision. Over the period of 
investigation, Oftel became Ofcom and the original complainant, Freeserve, changed its name twice, 
first to Wanadoo and later to Orange. The decision was issued six years after the end of the alleged 
abuse. This is relevant for two main reasons.39 First, it increases the risk that ex ante pricing decisions 
may be seen through the lens of an ex post realisation. For example, ex post the original take-up forecasts 
may now seem overoptimistic, but they may have not been so at the time, given the information available 
then. Second and more importantly, this lag may have allowed Ofcom to carefully assess whether the 
alleged margin squeeze had any exclusionary effects on BT’s competitors. Ofcom relied on the formal 
argument that a finding of abuse did not40 require evidence of effects: “[a] competition authority is not 
required to demonstrate that the conduct under investigation actually had an adverse effect on 
competition within the relevant market”.41 However, this case would have particularly benefitted from 
at least some analysis of how competition evolved in the downstream market, where the squeeze was 
alleged to have taken place. This is particularly important for two reasons. First, any price-cost test 
results are subject to uncertainty and, in this case, the test did not yield very clear results. Margins shifted 
                                                     
38 Ofcom, 2010, paras 3.79 and 3.82. “[D]uring the period under investigation, LLUOs [Local Loop Unbundling Operators] 
had little impact on the market for wholesale intermediate services: their market share remained low, and was less than 
2% between June 2002 and December 2004, and in general they tended to focus on supplying business, rather than 
residential, services” (Ofcom, 2010, para 3.79). 
39 In addition, this reduces the deterrence effect. 
40 It would now after the ECJ Intel Judgement (ECJ, 2017).  
41 Ofcom, 2010, para 4.5. 
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from being positive to negative depending on the assumptions. The estimated margins also changed over 
time from statement of objections to final decision and depending on the method used. Second, the abuse 
was alleged to have taken place over the period 2002 and 2004. By 2010, Ofcom would have been able 
to observe if BT Retail had been able to gain any market share during the period of alleged abuse or 
shortly after the abuse had ceased. It could have also assessed if any rival ISPs had exited the 
downstream market over the relevant period. The decision is silent on this. Ofcom reports that as of 
December 2004, BT’s share of retail broadband connections was 24%.42 Just a couple of years later its 
share had increased to 26% (Ovum, 2006). With the abuse ending in December 2004, this does not 
suggest that the alleged squeeze substantially increased BT’s downstream market share. The decision 
contains no analysis of whether ISPs entered or exited the market during the relevant period. Ofcom 
argued that it needed “strong and compelling evidence” on negative margins in order to find an abuse. 
However, any analysis based on the price-cost test will always be inherently uncertain, unless perhaps 
if the authority found evidence that the dominant firm had knowingly incurred losses. This means that 
analysis of effects becomes even more important to limit the risk of errors.  
3.1.2 Thus/Gamma – an innovative decision, but should Ofcom have opened an investigation?  
In 2013 Ofcom found that BT did not abuse its upstream dominant position in the supply of Call 
Origination (CO) and Call Termination (CT), which are key upstream inputs for BT and its rival resellers 
to supply wholesale (end-to-end) calls to resellers, by engaging in a margin squeeze in the downstream 
market. Resellers competed with BT and other Carrier Pre-selection Operators (CPSOs) in a “further 
downstream” market, where they provided call services to final consumers. Ofcom found that overall 
BT earned negative margins in the downstream market, but critically, as this did not result in anti-
competitive effects, it concluded that no margin squeeze had taken place. Ofcom also concluded that 
BT showed no intent.43 Figure 2 illustrates the various components and players along the vertical chain. 
BT:  
 sells calls directly to consumers in the further downstream market as a vertically integrated 
supplier, while at the same time also;  
 provides wholesale call services to resellers in the downstream market where it competes with 
rival CPSOs, like Thus and Gamma, the complainants in this case, who purchase CT and CO from 
BT, while they either self-supply core network services or purchase them from BT or other 
network operators. CPSOs44 repackage these inputs into a call wholesale product sold to resellers 
or they are vertically integrated and supply directly into the further downstream market;45 and 
 supplies CO, CT and core network services in the upstream market.  
The margin squeeze allegation made by Thus and Gamma concerned the downstream market.  
Figure 2 also shows additional alternatives in the downstream market where consumers may be 
interested in bundles of services, which include but are not limited to voice. We refer to this in the next 
section, where we assess this decision.  
  
                                                     
42 Ofcom, 2010, para 2.21. 
43 Ofcom, 2013, paras 1.6 and 6.8. 
44 There are about 900 of them (Ofcom, 2013, para 3.62). 
45 Ofcom, 2013, para 3.61. 
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Figure 2: A graphical description of the vertical market structure 
 
In terms of market definition, Ofcom considered three different levels: upstream, downstream and 
further downstream. The upstream market was where Ofcom had to find dominance. Ofcom defined 
three separate upstream markets covering the essential inputs CO, CT (which BT must supply at 
regulated prices) and core network services. The product market definitions adopted were exactly the 
same as those defined for the purpose of ex ante regulation.46 Ofcom defined the downstream market as 
the supply of wholesale end-to-end calls to the merchant market. The non-infringement decision was 
based on the narrowest possible product market and, hence, Ofcom argued there was no need to conclude 
on the precise boundaries.47 It argued a wider market definition, “as a result of changing our approach 
to indirect substitutes”, would not make anti-competitive effects more likely.48 
Given the focus on a narrow set of upstream markets, Ofcom also relied on the evidence gathered in 
its ex ante market reviews49 to conclude that BT was dominant in the provision of CO and CT services.50 
Ofcom also concluded that the inputs supplied in the upstream markets – i.e. CO and CT – were 
indispensable for participating in the downstream market.51 Unlike in Freeserve, there was no analysis 
                                                     
46 Ofcom, 2013, para 4.213. 
47 Ofcom, 2013, para 4.4. 
48 Ofcom, 2013, para 4.152, see also paras 4.178, 4.180 and 4.214. For all markets, Ofcom concluded there was a single UK 
geographic market (excluding the Hull area). 
49 “Given the extensive and recent/contemporaneous nature of the market power assessment exercise carried out in those 
reviews, and the absence of any evidence to contradict that assessment, we considered it was appropriate to rely on the 
conclusions of those reviews to assess BT’s market power during the period of the investigation” (Ofcom, 2013, para 5.17). 
50 Ofcom, 2013, para 5.33. 
51 Ofcom, 2013, paras 1.8 and 5.12. 
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of indirect constraints in the further downstream market,52 because Ofcom focused on a narrower market 
definition given that this was a non-infringement decision.53 Nonetheless, Ofcom considered whether 
LLU could be a possible substitute for the “indispensable” CO and CT inputs or to wholesale end-to-
end calls at various stages in the decision.54 LLU was not as widespread at the time of this decision, as 
it became later on.55 Ofcom noted that “the decline in CPS lines after June 2006 coincided with the 
introduction of competition from LLU in the provision of exchange lines and the launch by Carphone 
Warehouse Group (now TalkTalk Group) in April 2006 of its ‘free broadband’ offer (to residential 
customers), which had the effect of attracting customers.”56 Nonetheless, Ofcom identified two 
significant limitations on the extent to which LLU-based wholesale services could provide an 
interoperable or comparable service to wholesale calls:57  
 the focal product was wholesale end-to-end calls and there were no LLU based voice-only offers; 
and  
 LLU was not ubiquitous and CPS (based on CT and CO) is the first step in the ladder of investment 
theory (Cave, 2006), whereby rivals can enter with limited investment and later on, they are 
“nudged” to invest more in their networks and move on to LLU. Ofcom recognised that “firms 
may consider the use of CPS to be a method of building a sufficiently large customer base to justify 
the additional investment required to enter LLU. We suggested that by allowing BT to margin 
squeeze on the basis of ‘pure’ CPS wholesale calls (by which we meant competitors entirely reliant 
on access products for upstream inputs), firms could be foreclosed from securing a large customer 
base before developing an LLU product. Therefore, to prevent the potential for foreclosing 
dynamic retail competition, we considered that BT’s Wholesale Calls’ prices should be replicable 
on the basis of all potential wholesale inputs”.  
Although Ofcom’s approach to assessing a margin squeeze did not depart from the standard, it placed 
significantly more emphasis on effects: “there must be at least the potential for anti-competitive effects 
in the downstream market or related markets as a consequence of the failure to maintain a sufficient 
margin.”58 
Ofcom recognised that the upstream inputs prices were regulated and, hence, BT could only engage 
in a margin squeeze by lowering its downstream price.59 In testing for a margin squeeze Ofcom: 
 opted for a LRIC cost standard;60  
 estimated the costs related to output increments for both total output and selected individual CPS 
contracts.61 As Ofcom explained, “the key difference between the potential tests is the amount of 
                                                     
52 Ofcom, 2013, paras 4.48-49. 
53 “Given that both CPS and Wholesale Calls originate on BT’s network, we consider BT wholesale call origination is 
necessary for the supply of wholesale end-to-end calls. However, even if the downstream market were expanded to include 
wholesale call products provided using IA and LLU, BT wholesale call origination would be a necessary input in the supply 
of wholesale calls to the merchant market, for the nationwide provision of wholesale end-to-end calls” (Ofcom, 2013, para 
5.34). 
54 Ofcom, 2013, para 4.101. 
55 There were around 23 LLU operators active in the UK during the relevant period of investigation that varied in size and 
coverage (Ofcom, 2013, para 3.20); around 1.8 million phone lines in the UK were fully unbundled, which represented 6% 
of all lines in the UK (Ofcom, 2013, para 4.102) and at the end of 2008 LLU was technically available at local exchanges 
covering 84% of the UK population (85% at the end of 2009) (Ofcom, 2013, para 4.10). 
56 Ofcom, 2013, para 3.54. 
57 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.219. 
58 Ofcom, 2013, para 1.16 (emphasis added). 
59 Ofcom, 2013, paras 6.24-26. 
60 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.28. 
61 Ofcom, 2013, paras 6.53-54. 
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downstream operation common costs that are included in the cost stacks. In the case of the 
individual service, the definition of incremental cost is very narrow. By contrast the inclusion of 
various common costs means that the definition of incremental cost at the total downstream 
operation (“total product”) level is wide.”62 Ofcom concluded that its “primary concern was the 
total product test”,63 however it also recognised that “there are circumstances in which individual 
contracts may be of particular importance to competition (…) For example, in markets where 
there are strong economies of scale, individual contracts could be considered to be ‘competition 
enablers’. In such circumstances, (…) winning the contracts that drive the largest volumes will be 
important for firms to enable them to operate at, or beyond, the minimum efficient scale. Also, 
even if an incumbent or dominant firm is operating significantly beyond the minimum efficient 
scale it may adopt a strategy of aggressively pursuing large volume contracts as a mechanism to 
deny entrants the opportunity to reach the minimum scale and therefore effectively compete in the 
market.”64 Ofcom clarified that such concerns would be heightened when: (a) there is a very small 
number of very large (principally residential) contracts and a long tail of smaller contracts; and 
(b) there are fixed costs that give rise to some economies of scale for CPSOs;65 
 estimated the margins of the basis of both an EEO and an adjusted EEO test, though it expressed 
a preference for the latter.66 Ofcom acknowledged that “it is possible that the costs of an entrant 
could be higher than those of the incumbent due to the incumbent having some unmatchable cost 
advantages arising from its legacy monopoly position”;67  
 considered two approaches for a price-cost test: (a) historical (retrospective) analysis – this can be 
done on a period-by-period basis or on a discounted cash flow basis;68 or (b) forward-looking 
(prospective) analysis.69 Ofcom opted for the historical case, as it argued that in stable markets 
such as this, the role of a forward-looking approach would be more limited. It also gave preference 
to a period-by-period approach;70 and 
 chose the relevant period as that from March 2008 to April 200971 due to data availability.72 
However, subsequently BT made available data covering the period up to December 2010 and 
Ofcom undertook some sensitivity analysis over this longer time-period.73  
In the statement of objections Ofcom concluded that “there was strong evidence that BT failed to 
maintain a sufficient margin between its upstream and downstream prices”,74 over at least the period 
July 2008 to April 200975 both under an EEO and adjusted EEO basis.76 Overall, this was confirmed in 
                                                     
62 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.36. 
63 Ofcom, 2013, paras 6.41 and 6.51. 
64 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.42. 
65 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.43. 
66 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.65-82. 
67 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.74. Ofcom identified the CPS annual charge and the CPS transfer charges as the two key costs that 
BT does not incur but entrants do, the latter being a more significant item (Ofcom, 2013, paras 6.80-81). 
68 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.119. 
69 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.83 
70 Ofcom, 2013, paras 6.125-140. Note that the cohort analysis Ofcom undertook in other cases, such as Freeserve, coincides 
with the contract-by-contract assessment.  
71 Ofcom, 2013, paras 6.110-111. 
72 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.145. 
73 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.362. 
74 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.88. 
75 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.379. 
76 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.337. 
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the final decision and Ofcom found that BT “earned negative margins overall and on eight individual 
contracts over the period July 2008 to April 2009, its contract with [Company 1] being the most 
significant in terms of contributing to its negative margins for the product as a whole. Absent this 
contract BT’s margins become sensitive to the time period modelled. Although they remain negative for 
the period July 2008 to April 2009, they become positive over the longer period ending December 2010. 
As such, absent [Contract 1], the evidence of BT earning a negative margin on the Wholesale Calls 
product is sensitive to the time period modelled.”77  
As the role of Contract 1, in particular, was very important to Ofcom’s conclusions, it is worth 
covering Ofcom’s analysis further.78 Contract 1 (and to a lesser extent Contract 2) accounted for a large 
(21-30%) proportion of total minutes supplied by BT79 and BT made substantial losses on it (estimated 
at -10 and -20%) under both an adjusted and EEO test.80 This meant that BT’s failure to cover its total 
services costs over the period July 2008 to April 2009 and also to December 2010 was primarily as a 
result of BT’s pricing of Contract 1. Critically, when Ofcom excluded Contract 1 from its analysis over 
the longer period from July 2008 to December 2010, BT covered its costs for the entire output increment 
under both an EEO and adjusted EEO tests.81  
The decision analysed extensively the possible anti-competitive effects of the pricing of Contract 1. 
Even if BT’s overall margins were negative and only became positive by excluding Contract 1, Ofcom 
concluded that it had insufficient evidence of anti-competitive effects and that there was a good 
explanation as to why anti-competitive effects were not expected from BT’s pricing of Contract 1. The 
analysis of effects is what made Ofcom change its views from its statement of objections to its final 
decision.82 Ex post evidence was critical. Ofcom argued that “[g]iven the passage of time in this case, it 
is, however, appropriate to take into account available evidence of what has happened in the market to 
inform our assessment of what was likely to happen.”83 It concluded that it did “not have sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that any of the potential effects identified in the Statement of Objections have 
materialised in the more than four years since BT first earned negative margins on the Wholesale Calls 
product. Given the time elapsed since BT’s conduct, the failure of actual effects to have materialised so 
far, and the reasons for this, we consider it unlikely that the effects identified in the Statement of 
Objections were likely to materialise, and that they are unlikely to materialise in the future.”84  
Ofcom concluded that its “assessment suggests that competition in the market for the supply of 
wholesale end-to-end calls has not reduced in the more than four years since BT first earned negative 
margins on the Wholesale Calls product. While total volumes across the merchant market have declined 
since 2008, and this decline has not been evenly distributed across CPSOs, we have not seen evidence 
that this is a result of BT’s pricing conduct. The loss of CPS volumes would not seem to have significantly 
affected the CPSOs’ cost base, nor their incentives to maintain and invest in core networks. Moreover, 
we do not have evidence that BT’s pricing conduct gave rise to reputational effects and discouraged 
competitors from bidding for wholesale end-to-end call contracts.”85 
                                                     
77 Ofcom, 2013, paras 1.30-31. 
78 Contract 2 was less important as its margins were negative but to a much lesser extent than for Contract 1 – i.e. ranging 
between 0% and - 10% - (Ofcom, 2013, para 6.349) and, unlike Contract 1, the profitability of Contract 2 improves 
significantly when a longer time-period is considered (Ofcom, 2013, para 6.367).  
79 Ofcom, 2013, para 7.165. 
80 Ofcom, 2013, para 6.343. Over the longer time-period, the profitability of Contract 1 is similar to that over the shorter time-
period (Ofcom, 2013, para 6.345). 
81 Ofcom, 2013, paras 6.372 and 6.444. 
82 Ofcom, 2013, paras 1.2-3 and 7.2.  
83 Ofcom, 2013, para 7.30. 
84 Ofcom, 2013, para 7.5. 
85 Ofcom, 2013, para 7.11. See also paras 7.286 and 7.290. 
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There are a number of reasons as to why Ofcom concluded that negative margins in Contract 1 did 
not raise concerns about anti-competitive effects. First, Company 1 engaged in bilateral negotiations 
exclusively with BT. This was consistent with there being no other CPSO that would have been willing 
to offer Company 1 prices that it would have been willing to accept.86 Second, although Company 1 
“was now dependent on the supply of Wholesale Calls from BT to compete in the downstream market, 
BT’s ability to use this dependence to pursue an exclusionary strategy is, in the normal course of events, 
highly restricted by the terms of the long term agreement between BT and [Company 1]. Specifically, 
BT’s ability to unilaterally increase prices or terminate the contract is highly limited.”87 BT went further 
and argued that, as a result, “the net effect of the deal has been that BT, by giving [Company 1] the 
option to use BT’s network at a low cost for an indefinite period of time, “will have enhanced its ability 
to compete”
 
for as long as [Company 1] needs, and not only against other CPSOs but also against BT 
itself.”88  
Ofcom also found that “multiple firms compete for important contracts. For example, BT’s response 
suggests that it faced competition from at least one other bidder for all but one of the contracts it was 
invited to bid for. For a number of these contracts ([…]), BT suspects that it faced competition from 
three or more bidders.”89 Furthermore, there was evidence of BT’s rivals winning contracts when 
competing against BT.90  
The analysis of anti-competitive effects is important because at a high level the evidence showed that 
during the period of the alleged abuse, BT’s share of the merchant market grew rapidly and BT managed 
to steal business from all its main competitors.91 However, Ofcom’s detailed effect analysis allowed it 
to conclude that “BT’s rapid increase in market share was largely due to it winning two major contracts, 
[Contract 1 and Contract 2], which together accounted for [31-40%] of the merchant market (by value). 
Over the last two years, BT’s market shares have remained broadly constant.”92  
Assessment 
This decision has many positive and innovative features. The two-step assessment as to whether BT 
earned negative margins overall and, if so, what were the underlying causes was innovative and helped 
reducing the risk of making incorrect inferences from the price-cost test results. The analysis of whether 
the negative margins that BT made on Contract 1 could lead to anti-competitive effects was also 
particularly innovative. The theory of harm centred on BT’s possible incentives to exclude entrants for 
the particularly large order, such as Contract 1, because this could deprive entrants of the ability to 
exploit economies of scale (Fumagalli and Motta, 2013). Even if the evidence led Ofcom to reject this 
theory of harm, Ofcom was correct in testing this out. This case perfectly illustrates the benefits of 
carefully considering the effects of an alleged anti-competitive behaviour. Had Ofcom relied and 
stopped at a relatively high-level assessment of the price-cost test results, as in Freeserve, it would have 
incurred a Type I error (false conviction) and found an infringement where there was none. Hence, this 
is a real example of how considering anti-competitive effects can positively complement the other 
critical steps in a margin squeeze abuse assessment. 
While overall we consider that this was one of Ofcom’s best decisions, we also note that the 
investigation lasted five years only to reach a non-infringement decision. In this respect, it is legitimate 
                                                     
86 Ofcom, 2013, paras 7.250-253 and 7.271. 
87 Ofcom, 2013, paras 7.14, 7.256-258 and 7.272. 
88 Ofcom, 2013, para 7.94. 
89 Ofcom, 2013, para 7.191. 
90 Ofcom, 2013, para 7.193. 
91 Ofcom, 2013, paras 5.41 and 5.44. 
92 Ofcom, 2013, paras 5.45-46. 
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to pause and ask whether there was anything that Ofcom could have done in order to reach a more 
informed decision early on, as to whether it should have opened an investigation in the first place. One 
aspect, which the decision does not explore, is whether BT had sufficiently strong incentives to squeeze 
its CPSOs rivals. This is not only useful evidence in concluding whether or not a behaviour is anti-
competitive, but can also be critical in deciding whether or not to open an investigation. If an authority 
could conclude early on that the facts of the case pointed to the dominant firm not having incentives to 
exclude, it may decide not to open an investigation. There were significant factors pointing to BT not 
having strong incentives to engage in exclusionary behaviour: 
 as the upstream price was regulated, BT could have only squeezed the rivals’ downstream margins 
by lowering its downstream price. Ofcom acknowledged this.93 This makes this type of margin 
squeeze akin to predation and, critically, implies a profit sacrifice by BT, which would not 
necessarily be required if the margin squeeze involved instead increasing the upstream price 
(Crocioni and Veljanovski, 2003). When upstream inputs are expected to remain price regulated 
for the foreseeable future and when there are limited entry barriers downstream, rivals could exit 
but easily re-enter, as Ofcom noted,94 making it more difficult for the dominant firm to raise prices 
after the rivals’ exit;  
 any gains from exclusionary behaviour appear minimal because this was a declining market.95 
This makes the current costs of BT’s behaviour large relative to the future benefits from exclusion. 
It very much differs from Freeserve or SSFB, which involved rapidly growing markets; and 
 a strategy of squeezing rivals out of CPS could have had the effect of pushing BT’s rivals towards 
service bundles that required LLU. This was already taking place, driven by technology and 
consumers’ increasing preferences for bundled services. Ofcom acknowledged this by stating that 
“[w]e noted that, even if it were relevant, the investment decisions in LLU are primarily based on 
the expected demand for broadband services.”96 A margin squeeze in end-to-end wholesale calls 
could have accelerated this shift. As LLU requires rivals to purchase fewer inputs from BT, this 
would have increased the extent of competition BT would have faced across the vertical chain.97 
This is not an outcome that BT would have wanted to encourage. 
It may be worth considering the last point further. In defining the product market Ofcom argued against 
including services other than voice. One of the main reasons for doing so was that it “further identified 
that even if the downstream market definition was expanded to include wholesale call products provided 
using IA and LLU, BT wholesale call origination was still likely to be a necessary upstream input in the 
supply of wholesale calls to the merchant market.”98 In Figure 2, we show the options for customers and 
providers when they purchase not only a voice product but bundles of services, including often 
broadband access, sometimes TV and more rarely mobile services. BT’s rivals rely on LLU, together 
with CT (and some other services) in order to provide bundles of services. Ofcom may have concluded 
that these bundles are not part of the relevant market, but they may still exercise some constraint on 
BT’s ability to raise its upstream inputs prices to CPSOs. Critically, though when considering 
                                                     
93 See footnote 59. 
94 Ofcom, 2013, para 7.224. 
95 Ofcom, 2013, Figure 3.4. 
96 Ofcom, 2013, para 4.108. 
97 “In addition, C&W also provided its views on the economic context of the downstream market which is relevant to the 
effects assessment. C&W commented that the downstream market is “a mature market with a declining market size and 
revenue”, noting that the size of the market has decreased as providers such as TalkTalk and Sky migrate their customers 
to LLU” (Ofcom, 2013, para 7.149). Ofcom also argued that “[f]urthermore, the overall reduction in competitor volumes 
has taken place against the backdrop of a declining market, as call minutes are migrated to LLU” (Ofcom, 2013, para 
7.228).  
98 Ofcom, 2013, para 5.15. Interestingly Figure 3.2 (Ofcom, 2013) has a footnote: “Services provided using LLU have been 
excluded from the diagram.” 
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substitutability over a timeframe longer that that used for market definition purposes, the risk of an 
accelerated migration to LLU could be sufficient to dis-incentivise BT from squeezing its CPSO rivals. 
Therefore, a careful consideration of BT’s incentives to exclude may have suggested that it was unlikely 
that BT had engaged in exclusionary behaviour.  
Edwards and Walker (2013) go further to argue that Ofcom’s approach may limit BT’s ability to 
respond to competition from LLU operators. This on the basis that “[w]here end-customers buy 
broadband in a bundle with calls, the incremental cost of originating calls over LLU or fibre is 
considerably less than using BT CO.” They also question whether the use of a LRIC standard is 
appropriate when the concern is not about new entry, but well-established existing competitors that have 
already sunk their costs. This is because they argue that the main difference between LRIC and Average 
Avoidable Costs (AAC) is sunk costs. Although LRIC also includes non-sunk fixed costs, they raised a 
valid point, especially given that the strong preference for a LRIC cost standard in telecommunications 
cases can be called into question (Crocioni, 2018).  
3.1.3 Superfast Broadband - Back to the starting line 
Ofcom (2014) assessed whether BT had undertaken a margin squeeze in the retail provision of Super-
Fast Broadband (SFBB) services. At the time, the term SFBB indicated broadband connections with 
speeds of at least 30 Mbit/s,99 which then consisted of 17.5% of all UK broadband connections.100 BT 
was found dominant in the provision of upstream services that are required to provide retail SFBB 
services. Under Ofcom regulatory regime, BT’s competitors could get access to BT’s upstream inputs 
via Virtual Unbundled Local Access (VULA). Critically, BT had considerable freedom in setting the 
prices of both its upstream and downstream services, as it had no cost orientation obligation.101  
Ofcom assessed whether a margin squeeze had occurred for new customers cohorts at the prices of 
three offers - February 2013, May 2013 and January 2014 – and concluded that it “did not have sufficient 
evidence” to support a finding of abuse.102  
Market definition was not critical, as Ofcom concluded that BT would be dominant in the upstream 
market irrespective of whether the upstream market was defined as “wholesale local access” or, more 
narrowly, as just VULA services.103 While VM did not offer third party wholesale access to its cable 
network, BT supplied its retail customers and competing retail broadband providers.104 Unlike 
Freeserve, Ofcom did not consider in detail the issue of indirect constrains. Interestingly over the 
relevant period, VM had almost twice as many SFBB subscribers as BT.105  
Ofcom listed the same six standard conditions for a margin squeeze to be deemed an abuse, as in 
Thus/Gamma, but, unlike in Freeserve, including “(at least) the potential for anti-competitive effects in 
the downstream market as a consequence of the failure to maintain a sufficient margin.”106 Ofcom opted 
for a LRIC-based107 EEO test: “[w]e have investigated a number of allegations of anti-competitive 
exclusionary behaviour in recent years using our ex post competition powers. Despite some 
                                                     
99 Ofcom, 2014, para 2.7. 
100 Ofcom, 2014, para 2.8. 
101 Ofcom, 2014, paras 2.50-51. 
102 Ofcom, 2014, para 1.14. 
103 Ofcom, 2014, para 4.42. 
104 Ofcom, 2014, para 2.40. 
105 Ofcom, 2014, para 2.9. 
106 Ofcom, 2014, para 3.12.  
107 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.29. Note that unlike in Thus/Gamma “at least” is in brackets, signalling a small, but important, 
difference in emphasis.  
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consideration of REO cost test results, Oftel/Ofcom’s primary approach in these cases has been based 
on an EEO methodology.”108 In reaching this conclusion not to adjust the EEO costs, Ofcom considered 
three approaches: 
 as in Thus/Gamma, if entrants had higher costs than incumbent due to regulatory obligations. 
Ofcom concluded that “we consider that BT’s total costs associated with its choice of wholesale 
inputs are likely to be higher than other CPs’ costs because it uses WLR rather than MPF”;109  
 based on BT’s economies of scales and scope. Ofcom argued that BT would not be “able to 
reliably estimate the network costs of its competitors”;110 and 
 for differences in customer bases between entrants and dominant firm as “TalkTalk claimed that 
BT has a base of legacy customers who make a very high volume of calls. TalkTalk submitted that 
these customers are not contestable by rivals and therefore should be excluded from the EEO 
test.”111  
The treatment of the common and shared costs and the relevant output increment was critical and 
required a significant degree of judgement when applying the price-cost test. Ofcom examined in 
significant detail how to treat shared and common costs because “[a]lthough there are some costs which 
can be considered as SFBB-specific (e.g. the supply of routers), there are several costs categories (such 
as platform costs and portal fees) which are shared between SBB and SFBB. There are also some cost 
categories (such as customer service and some marketing costs) that are shared with voice and TV 
services (i.e. additional products sold by BT Consumer) and others that are shared with the rest of BT 
Group.”112 Ofcom considered the degree of scalability of the main shared costs113 and acknowledged it 
had to exercise significant judgement.114 Ofcom also had to exercise judgement in deciding to run a 
price-cost test on (a) SFBB alone, excluding therefore other ADSL-based broadband services;115 (b) on 
all BT’s retail products together;116 and (c) in including both voice and TV services.117 
  
                                                     
108 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.9. 
109 Ofcom, 2014, paras 5.20 and 5.93-95. 
110 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.22. 
111 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.25. 
112 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.77. 
113 Ofcom, 2014, paras 5.83-92. 
114 Two examples illustrate this. First, Ofcom applied “a specific percentage to cost items that are shared across all BT 
Consumer products. This percentage represents our estimate of those costs that are incremental to the SFBB portfolio” 
(Ofcom, 2014, paras 5.87). Second, in relation to BT Group costs, Ofcom “[a]s the first types of cost (direct and indirect) 
are primarily driven by BT Consumer, we consider them to be scalable in a similar manner to costs such as IT, 
accommodation and labour. We therefore include a proportion of direct and indirect BT TSO costs in our assessment of 
LRIC for the SFBB portfolio” (Ofcom, 2014, paras 5.90). 
115 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.53. 
116 “While we acknowledge that some of BT’s competitors’ (including TalkTalk’s) customer bases may have different 
characteristics to BT’s customer base, we note that all SFBB providers offer a range of SFBB packages which vary by 
speed and value-added features. We consider it appropriate for our test to allow competitors to compete for the portfolio 
of BT’s SFBB services as a whole” (Ofcom, 2014, para 5.62). 
117 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.74. 
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The price-cost test adopted118 can be expressed simply as:  
 
(1) P – AC – OCD – FCD > 0 
where:  
 
P = all retail revenues from supplying SFBB; 
AC = the price of wholesale inputs supplied by BT; 
OCD = BT’s downstream operating costs; and  
FCD = BT’s downstream one-off/upfront (mostly customer acquisition) costs. 
Ofcom considered all the three approaches it relied on in Freeserve: (a) discounted cash flow; (b) period-
by-period approach and (c) cohort analysis.119 However, Ofcom relied solely on the cohort analysis 
because doing so allowed it to carry out the analysis using BT’s historic (rather than forecast) financial 
data;120 assess profitability over the expected average customer lifetime; and consider new customers 
and be representative of the prices against which an EEO would compete to acquire new customers.121 
Ofcom also made another important assumption: “[i]n applying the cohort approach we assume that 
BT’s monthly margins (i.e. both revenues and costs) stay constant over time. By not factoring in price 
increases during the average customer lifetime, we ensure that the analysis does not build in the 
potential anti-competitive effects of pricing below cost for an initial period.”122  
This translates into testing whether the NPV of historical margins cover the initial one-off customer 
acquisition costs: 
 
(2) ∑ (𝑃 − 𝐴𝐶 − 𝑂𝐶𝐷) ∗
𝑛
𝑡=1 (1 + 𝑖)
−𝑡 > 𝐹𝐶𝐷 
where: 
 
 n = the average customer lifetime; and 
(𝑃 − 𝐴𝐶 − 𝑂𝐶𝐷) = yearly profit margin, which is assumed to remain constant at historical 
levels. 
Ofcom dedicated a large part of this decision to the question of whether BT Sport should be included in 
the May 2013 and January 2014 offers. This follows BT’s announcement on 9 May 2013 that its 
broadband customers would be able to access its BT Sport package in standard definition free of charge 
from its launch on 1 August 2013.123 Ofcom argued that BT’s strategy was to use BT Sport to support 
its broadband business: “we consider that if BT did not expect returns from the margin on incremental 
or retained broadband subscribers, it is likely either that BT would not have incurred the same 
investment costs, or that it would have adopted different approaches to distributing the channel. 
Accordingly, we consider that part of the costs of BT Sport should be considered as part of BT’s costs 
                                                     
118 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.98. 
119 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.101. 
120 Ofcom also argued that its “assessment uses actual data for 2012/13 wherever possible, meaning that we do not need to 
rely on a large number of assumptions or forecasts (an important exception to this is in relation to BT Sport, which is 
discussed in Section 6)” (Ofcom, 2014, para 5.119). This required significant judgement as Ofcom had to decide how to 
allocate common and shared costs. 
121 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.118. 
122 Ofcom, 2014, para 5.125. 
123 Ofcom, 2014, para 2.24. 
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of serving its broadband customers.”124 Ofcom added “the total costs125 of BT Sport (e.g. in respect of 
content and production costs) having subtracted direct revenues from BT Sport (e.g. wholesale deals 
with Virgin Media and Setanta in Ireland, sales to commercial customers (‘pubs and clubs’), sales to 
residential customers on the Sky platform, and channel advertising revenues).”126 Therefore, Ofcom 
considered BT Sport as an additional customer acquisition costs, which is equivalent to adding it to FCD 
in (2).127 Ofcom assessed revenues and costs over a three-year period, which corresponded with the 
duration of the sport rights BT acquired at the auction.128 This meant that the full cost of the Premier 
League (PL) rights was included pro rata in Ofcom’s calculation of the net costs.129 
Based on the results of its price-cost test (including a range of sensitivity assessment),130 Ofcom 
concluded that “BT maintained a sufficient margin between its upstream and downstream prices such 
that it covered its downstream costs.”131  
Ofcom included “(at least) the potential for anti-competitive effects in the downstream market as a 
consequence” among the six conditions for finding a margin squeeze and stated that it “provide[d] [its] 
comments in relation to the potential for anti-competitive effects in the downstream market as a 
consequence of any failure to maintain a sufficient margin.”132 However, Ofcom did not consider it 
necessary to look at the effects, because it concluded that no margin squeeze had taken place according 
to its price-cost test results.133 TalkTalk claimed that BT’s main rivals have achieved only a combined 
market share of 9% of customers using BT’s local access network.134 The decision also states that “[a]t 
the time of the complaint, the number of SFBB customers served by these providers [TalkTalk and Sky] 
was relatively low, but was increasing over time. In December 2013, TalkTalk served 177,000 SFBB 
customers which increased from 73,000 SFBB customers in March 2013.”135  
Assessment 
This is not a conceptually complex case. Ofcom correctly left the market definition open and took a 
conservative approach by applying the price-cost test to the narrowest possible market. However, some 
aspect of the decision are very formalistic and in stark contrast with Thus/Gamma and also with 
Freeserve. 
First, unlike Freeserve, where indirect constraints played a critical role in a similar market, these 
were not mentioned at all. Although we are critical of Ofcom’s approach to this issue in Freeserve, it is 
surprising that Ofcom did not take into account VM’s downstream market share at all. This is especially 
surprising given that VM had twice as more subscribers than all consumers that subscribed to BT and 
all providers relying on VULA.  
                                                     
124 Ofcom, 2014, para 6.36. 
125 Ofcom used BTs historical revenues and costs, where available, and forecasts where there was no historical data available 
(Ofcom, 2014, para 6.61) and to estimate future BT Sport subscribers (Ofcom, 2014, para 6.65). 
126 Ofcom, 2014, para 6.8. 
127 Ofcom, 2014, para 6.38. 
128 Ofcom, 2014, paras 6.50-53. 
129 Ofcom, 2014, para 6.46. 
130 The reason for running a sensitivity assessment was that “[a]lthough we consider that our approach overall represents a 
reasonable view of BT’s margins for its SFBB products, we recognise that any modelling exercise involves making a 
number of assumptions” (Ofcom, 2014, para 7.42).  
131 Ofcom, 2014, para 7.49. 
132 Ofcom, 2014, para 7.5. 
133 Ofcom, 2014, paras 1.14, 5.53 and 7.54. 
134 Ofcom, 2014, para 2.66. 
135 Ofcom, 2014, para 2.10. 
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Second and critically, Ofcom argued that there was no need for assessing the effects of BT’s alleged 
behaviour, because this would only be required if the price-cost test pointed to negative margins. This 
would be correct only if we expected no, or a very small degree of, uncertainty in the price-cost test 
estimates. Indeed, if this was the case, one could argue that any effect assessment would be redundant. 
The price-cost test would be a good proxy for anti-competitive effects. Unfortunately, running a price-
cost test requires authorities to exercise substantial judgement. A number of examples were mentioned 
above, including the decision on how to allocate shared and common costs to SFBB, the assumption of 
constant operating margins and the timescale for recovering FPLA auction rights costs.136 Uncertainty 
is, therefore, unavoidable. This means that there is a high risk of committing either Type I or Type II 
error. However, Ofcom’s decision to only rely on the cohort approach and rule out from the start the 
discounted cash flow and period-by-period approach may have increased rather than reduced this risk. 
Undertaking all three analysis would have improved the amount of information available to Ofcom.  
However, the key contribution to ensuring that Ofcom minimised the risk of incurring either a Type 
I or II error would be to ensure that the results of the price-cost test were aligned with the observed or 
likely effects of BT’s behaviour in the market. The two are complementary pieces of analysis, whereby, 
a negative (positive) price-cost test outcome needs to be reinforced by evidence that the dominant firms’ 
competitors have (have not) been excluded. Ofcom’s decision does not contain sufficient information 
to provide comfort that its price-cost test and its effects analysis were aligned. The only information 
available suggests that the number of SFBB subscribers of BT’s main competitors, TalkTalk and Sky, 
was small, but increasing, with TalkTalk’s subscribers more than doubling from March to December 
2013. However, in a growing market such as SFBB, it would have been useful to show trends in relative 
market shares and how these may have changed pre, during and, if possible, post the alleged abuse. 
Hence, while Ofcom’s decision may have been correct in this case, it seems incorrect to argue a priori 
that an effect-based analysis in a margin squeeze is not required, unless there is an indication that 
margins may be negative. Overall, this decision does not show much evolution from Freeserve and is a 
significant step back from Thus/Gamma. 
3.2 Other abuse of dominance cases 
Although most of Ofcom’s recent decisions deal with margin squeeze abuses, some earlier cases covered 
predatory and non-price discrimination abuses.  
3.2.1 Predation without dominance 
Ofcom found that BT had not engaged in predation in the market for the wholesale distribution of all 
consumer fixed-line telephone equipment (though the complaint was limited to cordless phones, hence, 
the case is referred to as Cordless Phones) in the UK.137 Despite concluding that BT was not dominant 
in such a market and there was no indication of intent,138 Ofcom went on to assess whether BT had 
predated. Ofcom argued that its finding that BT had not priced below costs reinforced its conclusion on 
dominance as the complainant had alleged that BT’s strategy had raised entry barriers.139  
                                                     
136 For example, although Ofcom (2014, para 6.53) argued that there are uncertainties beyond the three-year period chosen to 
recover the cost of acquiring the FPLA rights, it is likely that the winner of the rights enjoyed some incumbency advantages 
which makes it more likely to win again the rights at the following auction. If correct, that was a benefit that translated into 
future lower costs that should be factoredin. This was a further area where judgement was required (Ofcom, 2014, para 
6.56). 
137 Ofcom, 2006, paras 127-135. 
138 Ofcom, 2006, para 662. 
139 Ofcom, 2006, para 5. 
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BT’s market share was in the 40-50% range.140 However, Ofcom did not solely rely on market shares 
in its dominance assessment. It noted that BT’s prices trended very similarly to prices of other suppliers 
and that BT did not initiate any price reductions,141 barriers to entry and expansion were low142 and BT 
was restrained by retailers’ buyer power.143 Ofcom’s analysis of BT’s internal documents also reinforced 
its conclusion that BT did not have market power.144  
Ofcom argued that “[a]lthough BT's share is high in this market, Ofcom considers that there are 
other important factors, in particular low barriers to entry and expansion, and constraints imposed on 
BT’s pricing from demand side constraints that limit any ability for BT to act independently of 
competitors and consumers.”145 Therefore, it concluded BT was not dominant.146  
Nonetheless, Ofcom decided to also test for predation. It justified this on the basis that: “having 
regard to the relatively high level of BT’s market share, Ofcom has also considered it appropriate to 
examine whether BT was pricing below cost and whether the complainants’ allegations of predation 
could be supported in the event that Ofcom’s conclusion on dominance was incorrect.”147 Separately for 
each of the ten phone models it selected, Ofcom assessed whether BT’s prices covered its: 
 Average Variable Costs (AVC) - Ofcom concluded that all BT’s phone models made a 
contribution to recover BT’s costs,148 with one exception, which it found objectively justified;149 
and 
 Fully Allocated Costs (FAC) - Ofcom also concluded that BT recovered the FAC for all, but for 
two phone models, one of which was the same for which Ofcom found BT did not cover its 
AVC.150  
Ofcom noted that the FAC test and the application of both tests to each phone model was a stricter 
predation test than required.  
Assessment 
This is an example of a case that should have not progressed to a full investigation. Although BT’s share 
of wholesale distribution of phones was relatively high, a priori it does not seem that there could have 
been substantial barriers to entry into distribution. Hence, BT appeared unlikely to be dominant and, as 
a result, its incentives to predate were unclear. Hence, this is a further example of how an early 
assessment of BT’s incentives may have advised against opening an investigation.  
Once Ofcom opened the case and concluded that BT was not dominant, there was also no need to go 
further and undertake a price-cost test for predation. The argument by Ofcom that to test for predation 
was useful in case BT’s dominance was incorrect is unconvincing, especially given that, critically, 
Ofcom had concluded that BT never initiated the price reductions in its sample of ten phone models. 
                                                     
140 Ofcom, 2006, paras 151-212. 
141 Ofcom, 2006, paras 219-222. 
142 Ofcom, 2006, para 341. 
143 Ofcom, 2006, paras 399-401. 
144 Ofcom, 2006, paras 662. 
145 Ofcom, 2006, para 426. 
146 Ofcom, 2006, para 429. 
147 Ofcom, 2006, para 430. 
148 Ofcom, 2006, para 561. 
149 Ofcom, 2006, para 579. 
150 Ofcom, 2006, paras 620-624. 
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Lastly, we note that while the market was defined to include all phone models, Ofcom applied its 
price-cost tests separately to each of the ten models. It then focused on whether there was a justification 
for its finding of prices below cost for a few of the models. The purpose of this analysis is somewhat 
unclear given that a predation strategy that focuses on a small proportion of phone models is unlikely to 
be successful. The analysis appears more like a reflection of ex ante regulatory obligations that aims at 
ensuring that entrants can replicate the incumbent’s offer rather than a predation test. 
3.2.2 Non-price discrimination 
In June 2005, Ofcom published its final decision on whether to refer the fixed telecom sector to the CC 
under the EA02 (Ofcom, 2005, 2005a and 2005b). It accepted undertakings from BT in lieu of a 
reference. The theory of harm Ofcom identified was that a vertically integrated firm, dominant upstream, 
which is subject to cost based price caps for its upstream inputs, would have the ability and the incentives 
to engage in non-price discrimination against downstream rivals. According to Ofcom, BT had an 
incentive to supply worse quality upstream inputs to its downstream rivals. Ofcom argued that non-price 
discrimination is much harder for Ofcom to identify, and subsequently to verify than price 
discrimination.151  
Ofcom based its conclusion on its finding that BT was vertically integrated,152 had persistent market 
power in all upstream markets and, as a result, it was able to behave anti-competitively.153 Ofcom 
dedicated a significant attention to BT’s incentives to engage in non-price discrimination.154  
Ofcom started by stating that “[i]n theory, discriminating against downstream competitors will 
under most circumstances deliver two benefits to a vertically integrated firm with upstream market 
power:  
 capturing downstream profits. Discriminating against downstream competitors is likely to reduce 
the intensity of competition from downstream competitors, allowing the vertically integrated firm 
to earn higher profits downstream by raising prices, or increasing market share, or both; and 
 protecting upstream market power. Discriminating against downstream competitors could prevent 
the emergence of strong downstream competitors which could in future enter the upstream market, 
threatening at least in part the position of market power of the vertically integrated firm in 
upstream markets.”155  
This makes it clear that the behaviour could come both under the heading of static leveraging - i.e. trying 
to capture the downstream rivals’ profits – and dynamic leveraging - i.e. trying to protect upstream 
revenues by excluding downstream rivals’ attempts to enter upstream. 
Ofcom argued that “a vertically integrated firm with upstream market power may have more 
incentive to engage in non-price discrimination than price discrimination, as price discrimination may 
involve it forgoing short term profits. The incentives for a vertically integrated firm with market power 
to engage in discrimination are present even when engaging in non-price discrimination is costly for 
the firm. Moreover, Ofcom notes that these incentives would be even stronger for BT if by engaging in 
discriminatory behaviour, it was to save rather than incur costs.”156  
                                                     
151 Ofcom, 2015a, para F.28. 
152 Ofcom, 2015a, paras F.21-22. 
153 Ofcom, 2015a, paras F.3-20. 
154 Ofcom, 2015a, paras F.23-38. 
155 Ofcom, 2015a, para F.24. 
156 Ofcom, 2015a, para F.29. 
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Ofcom examined in details the factors that may affect BT’s incentives to engage in non-price 
discrimination: “Taking the example of a vertically integrated monopolist, who sells wholesale inputs 
also to a number of downstream competitors and is subject to price controls and an obligation not to 
discriminate, the incentive to engage in non-price discrimination increases if a number of factors exists: 
 if price regulation of the upstream input is tight;  
 the higher the downstream profit opportunity;  
 the higher the degree of substitutability between the vertically integrated and the competitors’ 
downstream products; and  
 the more efficient and the less capacity constrained the vertically integrated firm’s downstream 
division is.”157 
This follows the literature on non-price discrimination, which is referred to as sabotage (Cave et al., 
2006) and Ofcom provided some reasoning as to why it considers that these apply to BT’s position.158  
Lastly, Ofcom provided past examples that believed showed that BT had acted on its incentives.159 
In practice, these examples could be thought of as an analysis of anti-competitive effects, given that the 
behaviour was deemed to have lasted for years.  
Assessment 
In accepting BT’s undertaking in lieu of a reference to the CC, Ofcom adopted a clear ability, incentives 
and effects approach, though it did not provide detailed information and evidence, probably because this 
was not an infringement decision, but a decision to accept the remedies BT had proposed. The discussion 
of incentives is innovative, as it followed the literature on sabotage (Reiffen and Ward, 2002). However, 
there is limited details to better understand whether the empirical evidence strongly supported the factors 
that Ofcom mentioned as strengthening BT’s incentives. Although some evidence related to this case is 
available in separate article on this decision (Cave et al., 2006), it would be good practice to publish 
such information in the decision to provide better guidance to the industry.  
4. Conclusions 
Two sets of conclusions are drawn from the analysis of these cases. First, we consider how well the 
cases examined conform to our “enhanced” ability, incentives and effects framework. Second, we draw 
some general lessons for Ofcom in enforcing ex post competition law.  
4.1 Conformity to an “enhanced” ability, incentives and effect framework 
We draw the following conclusions (Table 3 provides a summary): 
1. Ability - We identified some concerns in Ofcom’s analysis. In Cordless Phones, Ofcom proceeded 
to undertake a full assessment of predation, despite a non-dominance finding. In Freeserve, Ofcom’s 
indirect constraints analysis was innovative, but was too preoccupied to adjust downstream market 
shares to support an upstream dominance finding. That led to missing out some critical inferences 
from the degree of downstream competition, suggesting that Ofcom should have relied on 
unadjusted downstream markets shares. Lastly, in a striking contrast with Freeserve, in SFBB there 
was no analysis of indirect constraints, despite VM had a share of retail subscribers more than double 
that of BT; 
                                                     
157 Ofcom, 2015a, para F.32. 
158 Ofcom, 2015a, para F.34- 37. 
159 Ofcom, 2015a, Annexes G-K. 
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2. Incentives - Considering whether a dominant firm had incentives to engage in exclusionary 
behaviour could improve the likelihood to select cases were concerns are founded. This concern 
emerges in a number of decisions. Thus/Gamma is overall an innovative decision, but perhaps an 
early consideration of incentives may have advised against opening an investigation. The same 
conclusions would apply to Cordless Phones, where considering BT’s incentives could have led to 
a similar early conclusion. All the other decisions contain no analysis of incentives, with the 
exception of Non-price discrimination where there was an assessment of the key factors that 
provided BT with an incentive to engage in exclusionary behaviour. As this was the oldest decision 
we examined, it is unclear why this approach was subsequently abandoned;  
3. Price-cost test - Price-cost test were the key, if not the sole, driver behind Ofcom’s non-infringement 
finding in both Freeserve and SFBB, where Ofcom neither examined BT’s incentives nor the effects 
of BT’s alleged behaviour. In Cordless Phones, the price-cost test was irrelevant, given the non-
dominance finding. Furthermore, the predation test was applied too narrowly to each phone model. 
Instead, in Thus/Gamma it was only an important first step of the analysis, which was adapted, 
refined and placed in the right context by a thorough analysis of effects.160 There is more consistency 
in terms of the choice between and EEO vs. REO test. Almost all cases opted for an EEO test with 
a notable exception. In Thus/Gamma Ofcom also undertook an adjusted EEO. Ofcom concluded 
that the evidence showed that an entrant incurred some cost driven by regulation that BT did not 
face. On that basis, it relied on an adjusted EEO test;161 
4. Empirical evidence - Thus/Gamma is the case which made the most extensive use of empirical 
evidence and facts. The remaining cases used evidence only for selected elements: in Freeserve and 
Cordless Phones, Ofcom used evidence to undertake a price-cost test and to establish dominance 
(i.e. the indirect effects adjustment in Freeserve), in SFBB and solely for the price-cost test, in Non-
price discrimination mostly to support its effect analysis; and  
5. Anti-competitive effects - The only decisions where anti-competitive effects were given full 
consideration and proved critical is Thus/Gamma. Ofcom took advantage of the fact that a 
significant time had elapsed from the alleged behaviour to assess whether it had led to exclusion. In 
Freeserve Ofcom had a similar opportunity in terms of elapsed time, but chose not to undertake any 
analysis of the potential anti-competitive effects. There is some analysis of effects in Non-price 
discrimination in the form of examples.162  
There are two main lessons from this assessment. First, in none of these decisions Ofcom has fully relied 
on a framework, such as the one suggested above, that could minimise the risk of committing either 
Type I or Type II errors. Second, while it is appropriate for an authority to adjust its approach to the 
features of the cases it faces, it is unclear whether Ofcom has been sufficiently consistent in its approach 
to provide clear guidance to companies. For example, the decisions do not clarify why in some cases the 
analysis of indirect constraint was critical while in other it was not. This also applies to the assessment 
of incentives, analysis of anti-competitive effects, need for a price-cost test and, if so, of which type. 
                                                     
160 In Royal Mail, Ofcom dismissed the need for a price-cost test altogether, though a margin squeeze framework appeared 
much more appropriate than examining BT’s behaviour as a price discrimination. As such, a price-cost test would have 
been a logical and critical first step in Royal Mail, (Crocioni, 2019).  
161 In Royal Mail, instead, although Ofcom opted against running a price-cost test, it strongly signalled that an REO standard 
would be more appropriate (Crocioni, 2019). 
162 In Royal Mail Ofcom appears to have undertaken some effects analysis, also because a sufficient amount of time had 
elapsed and the complainant ultimately exited the market. Ofcom’s Royal Mail decision argued against running a price-
cost test and, therefore, did not allow Ofcom to reach clear-cut conclusions on whether the complainant’s exit was due to 
RM’s behaviour or other reasons (Crocioni, 2019). 
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Table 3: Summary of Abuse of Dominance Cases Assessment  




(Too much focus on market 
shares and incorrect 
interpretation of indirect 
constraints) 
No  Yes 
 
Yes 
(Only in relation to the price-





Yes No  Yes Yes 
(Covering most aspects, but 
incentives) 
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(But there are some question 
marks about BT’s 
dominance given VM’s high 
share of subscribers) 
No  Yes 
(But only relied on one 
approach) 
Yes 






(It concludes that there was 
no dominance, but still 




(There was no need to run 
it, given the non-
dominance finding) 
Yes 
(Related to the price-cost test 







(But not backed up by 
empirical evidence) 
Not relevant 
(It was not required) 
No 
(The arguments were sketched, 
but the decision contained very 
little empirical evidence to 
support that, other than some 
examples of effects stemming 
from BT’s behaviour) 
Yes 
(In the form of examples of 
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4.2 Wider lesson for Ofcom to better apply ex post competition law 
Our recommendations come under three main headings.  
Better decision-making on whether or not to open investigations - most of the cases Ofcom decided 
to open have led to non-infringement decisions. While this in itself does not raise concerns, it highlights 
that Ofcom could benefit from a better gating process as to under which circumstances it should open 
an investigation. At the earliest phase prior to opening, or in the early phase of, an investigation Ofcom 
should consider: 
 which theory of harm could be relevant, under which conditions consumers could be harmed and 
testing at a high level whether preliminary evidence points to these condition being present. Ofcom 
did not spell out its main theory of harm in some instances; 
 whether a dominant firm has sufficiently strong incentives to exclude its rivals is critical at this 
stage. If not, Ofcom should carefully consider refraining from opening an investigation. This is 
relevant for many decisions - i.e. Thus/Gamma, cordless phones, SFBB and Freeserve; 
 whether ex ante intervention may address most concerns. In some cases addressing a regulatory 
failure may address the main alleged competition concern;  
 whether there are or likely to be any anti-competitive effects stemming from the alleged abuse, 
especially if some time has already elapsed since the period when the abuse took place. If no rival 
had exited since, Ofcom could refrain from opening an investigation (i.e. Freeserve, Cordless 
Phones and Thus/Gamma); and 
 whether during an early phase of the investigation evidence suggested that either the firm was 
unlikely to be dominant (i.e. Cordless Phones), had limited incentives to exclude (i.e. 
Thus/Gamma) and/or there was no evidence of anti-competitive effects (i.e. Freeserve and 
Thus/Gamma). Convincing evidence on either of the latter could suggest closing down an 
investigation at an early stage. 
Reducing the risk of errors - once Ofcom decided to open an investigation, it could undertake several 
actions to reduce the risk of incurring either a Type I or Type II error:  
1. spell out any relevant theories of harm, which Ofcom would like to test and all the required 
conditions;  
2. dedicate fewer resources to assess dominance based on static indicators, such as market shares. 
While consideration of indirect constraints was an important step in Freeserve, Ofcom was more 
concerned about adjusting market shares rather than fully understanding the implication of the 
presence of a vertically integrated rival on upstream competition; and 
3. focus more resources on thoroughly testing credible theories of harm, examine the dominant 
firm’s incentives and consistently assess the existing or potential for anti-competitive effects. 
Critically, the indications provided by each element of the analysis need to mash into a coherent 
exclusionary story. The clearest example is where a finding of negative margins in a price 
squeeze abuse does not match evidence of no exclusionary effects, as in Thus/Gamma. A similar 
analysis would have been helpful in Freeserve and SFBB. A further important consideration is 
whether a margin squeeze entails a profit sacrifice and the implications in terms of incentives of 
the dominant firm to exclude. For example, Ofcom could have relied more on the lack of 
incentives in Thus/Gamma.163 Incentives were only central in Non-price discrimination, the first 
decision examined.  
                                                     
163 Conversely, in Royal Mail Ofcom did not fully consider the fact that its own ex ante regulatory obligations allowed or even 
incentivised RM to engage in exclusionary behaviour with incurring a profit sacrifice. RM, therefore, had particularly 
strong incentives to exclude. 
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Stronger consistency in approach - the appropriate approach to exclusionary behaviour could change 
over time to reflect the evolution of the economic and legal thinking. Furthermore, the same approach 
may need to be adapted to the features and circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, we consider that 
Ofcom could provide significant benefits to the industry by adopting a more consistent approach, for 
example, by noting when it adopted an apparently different approach to similar cases and the reason for 
this choice. Examples include:  
 Indirect constraints – Ofcom dedicated significant attention to these in Freeserve. However, this 
analysis was absent in subsequent decisions, despite these had similar features to those in 
Freeserve. While Ofcom avoided examining indirect effects in Thus/Gamma by adopting the 
narrowest possible market definition, it is unclear why it did not assess the potential for indirect 
constraint from cable in SFBB, where VM had a substantially higher share of retail subscribers 
than BT; 
 Anticompetitive incentives – these were only considered in the first decision examined, Non-price 
discrimination. It is unclear why these were ignored in all subsequent decisions;  
 Anti-competitive effects – these were examined in detail only in Thus/Gamma and, in part, in Non-
price discrimination. We consider this analysis an important complement, at the very least, of the 
assessment of anti-competitive behaviour. It is unclear why Ofcom did not undertake this analysis 
in its other decisions; 
 Use of price-cost test – this is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to find an exclusionary 
abuse.  In Freeserve and SSFB the price-cost test was the main if not only piece of evidence Ofcom 
relied upon, while in Thus/Gamma it provided important, but not decisive, evidence of an abuse; 
 Type of test – there are a number of variations in the price-cost test, such as EEO, adjusted EEO 
or REO. Ofcom relied almost exclusively on an EEO test, but clearly justified its departure from 
this in Thus/Gamma;164 and 
 Methodology used in price-cost test – Ofcom often relied on a number of approaches to run a 
price-cost test. In Freeserve, it relied on three methods: historical, forward-looking NPV and 
cohort analysis. In Thus/Gamma, Ofcom justified opting for the historical approach, as it argued 
that in stable markets such as this, the role of a forward-looking approach would be more limited. 
It also gave preference to a period-by-period or cohort approach. This makes good sense. In SFBB, 
Ofcom also considered all the three approaches it relied on in Freeserve. However, it relied solely 
on a cohort analysis, because doing so, Ofcom argued, allowed it to carry out the analysis using 
BT’s historic (rather than forward-looking) financial data. This choice is more difficult to justify, 
as in SFBB (and in Freeserve) the market was growing, while in Thus/Gamma it was declining. 
This information suggests that a forward-looking approach would have been useful in SFBB.  
  
                                                     
164 However, it is unclear why in Royal Mail Ofcom argued in favour of, though did not apply, a REO test. 
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